Princ Security Analyst CTI

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The first URL was already dead.&nbsp;It did not load a credential form or show a fake Microsoft login page. Instead, it returned an expired tracking response, which is exactly what the operator wanted scanners and analysts to see after the first click.&nbsp;That could easily have been the end of the investigation: one reported phishing email, a burned link and no visible payload. But the expired URL still exposed enough of the underlying infrastructure to start pulling the thread. What followed led us to Mailer-Go Mission Control, a bulk phishing platform we had not seen publicly documented at the time of analysis.&nbsp;Mailer-Go handled the delivery side of the campaign, including email templates, recipient management, SMTP infrastructure, proxy support and per-recipient tracking links. The final phishing stage came later, through a Cloudflare Workers page running EvilTokens, a known Microsoft OAuth Device Code phishing kit.&nbsp;EvilTokens itself was not the new part. What caught our attention was the machinery around it: how victims were routed there, how the operator switched infrastructure when a domain was burned, and how much of the delivery chain was designed to disappear once a useful click had already happened.&nbsp;<h2>The link was expired, but the pattern was not&nbsp;</h2>The reported email contained a tracking URL under:&nbsp;coldchain-distribution[.]com&nbsp;The URL followed a structure we later associated with Mailer-Go:&nbsp;hxxps://&lt;8-hex&gt;.link.&lt;domain&gt;/t/v3.&lt;campaign-id&gt;.&lt;recipient-token&gt;&nbsp;Each recipient received a unique token. Once that token was used, later requests no longer reached the live phishing chain and instead returned an expired response. A victim could therefore see the real destination, while a scanner or analyst arriving afterwards saw something very different.&nbsp;That behavior became one of the more useful clues in the investigation. The link was not simply a route to a phishing page. It also acted as a gate that closed after use, limiting what could be recovered later from the same URL.&nbsp;The first domain, coldchain-distribution[.]com, was registered on 2026-06-01. Once detections started catching up, the operator moved activity to healthprofessionals21[.]org, which had been registered the same day. Its tracking subdomains resolved to the same Linode IP used by the earlier campaign, and more than 40 *.link.healthprofessionals21[.]org subdomains were eventually observed.&nbsp;<h2>A fake blog on the front door&nbsp;</h2>At the root, the replacement domain looked harmless.&nbsp;healthprofessionals21[.]org served a technology and gaming blog with articles about consoles, VPNs and multimedia devices. The content was thin and generic, but plausible enough to give scanners and casual visitors something ordinary to index. The phishing infrastructure itself sat underneath *.link.healthprofessionals21[.]org.&nbsp;

For a short time, the setup appears to have done its job. The replacement domain initially had little to no reputation-based detection while the phishing chain remained active.&nbsp;By 2026-06-10, that had started to change. Fortinet marked the domain as phishing and ESET flagged it as suspicious, but the operator had already been using it as failover infrastructure after coldchain-distribution[.]com was burned.&nbsp;<h2>What Mailer-Go is&nbsp;</h2>Mailer-Go Mission Control presents itself like a commercial email campaign platform. Its admin panel includes modules for campaign management, audience lists, email creation, SMTP providers, proxy routing, tracking, licensing and update notifications.&nbsp;None of those features, viewed individually, proves malicious intent. The combination is harder to explain as a normal bulk-mail product.&nbsp;Mailer-Go supports proxy routing and multiple SMTP providers, and it generates single-use tracking tokens that stop exposing the live destination after the first click. It also includes built-in license management, yet at the time of our analysis we could find no public documentation, GitHub footprint or visible legitimate product presence. The same Mailer-Go login page was exposed across wildcard campaign subdomains.&nbsp;We assess with moderate confidence that Mailer-Go is purpose-built crimeware rather than a legitimate phishing simulation tool being abused. That assessment is based on the platform as a whole: proxy support, flexible sending infrastructure, token burning, controlled access and the absence of a public legitimate footprint.&nbsp;Useful fingerprints include:&nbsp;Mailer-Go Mission Control&nbsp; /assets/js/tracking.js?v=20260522d&nbsp; /assets/js/proxies.js?v=20260513b&nbsp; /assets/js/sending-infrastructure.js?v=20260513b&nbsp; /assets/dist/emailbuilder2/manifest.json&nbsp;The observed admin panel HTML had this SHA-256:&nbsp;3a026fcb5001327198ac3886e6983183e44b8a5daa0086d34c10cb65130c6f89&nbsp;<h2>Live tokens showed the real destination&nbsp;</h2>The expired links were only part of the picture. URLScan captures of tokens that were still live showed a different path.&nbsp;Valid Mailer-Go tracking links routed through:&nbsp;mysocalledblog[.]com/sev/&nbsp;That relay then redirected the victim to a Cloudflare Workers page. Following the EvilTokens convention, the Workers subdomain encoded the targeted recipient's email address, which we have redacted:&nbsp;9sfo-bnqi-4yap.[recipient-redacted]-s-account.workers[.]dev&nbsp; &nbsp;The page presented itself as a OneDrive shared-document flow built around a file named Confidential_Memo.docx. Captures showed several stages of the page, including a “Preparing verification...” screen, a transient “fetch failed” error and, most importantly, the page displaying a Microsoft device code.&nbsp;

There was no fake Microsoft password form. The victim was sent to the real Microsoft device login page. If they entered the code and completed authentication, the attacker-controlled client could receive OAuth tokens in the background.That has an important consequence for incident response. Resetting the user's password may not be enough if a refresh token has already been issued. We cover the response steps later in the defenders section.Why Visa appeared in the redirect chainExpired tokens followed another route.Instead of reaching the EvilTokens page, they passed through:arduinosolutions[.]com/sev/and then landed on legitimate Visa sites such as visa[.]fr, visa[.]com, visa[.]de and others.That initially creates a confusing picture because Visa appears repeatedly in the redirect data, yet the confirmed phishing lure impersonated Microsoft OneDrive.The explanation was simpler. Visa acted as fallback cover for dead tokens. Once a tracking token had expired, the user was sent to a legitimate site rather than the phishing page. Someone clicking the link later could reasonably conclude that nothing malicious had happened, and an analyst reconstructing the chain after the fact could reach the same wrong conclusion.<h2>The emails were built to survive static scanning</h2>We identified five phishing EML samples tied to the campaign. Their MIME-header similarity supports the conclusion that they came from the same sending platform.The messages used generic B2B document themes, including an Autodesk-themed “Bidding Addendum” lure. We found no evidence of detailed industry reconnaissance, so the activity looks more like broad B2B targeting than a tightly tailored campaign.The email bodies also used a simple obfuscation technique in which characters were interleaved with question marks:T?h?i?s?The text remains readable to a person, but the added characters interfere with keyword matching and some content-based detection systems. At the time of analysis, the observed samples had zero detections across the engines available in our internal dataset.We also saw Microsoft SafeLinks wrapping in some of the messages. In those cases, the original Mailer-Go URL was stored in the originalsrc attribute rather than the visible href, so analysts reviewing mail traces should inspect both.<h2>What defenders should take from this</h2>The most useful Mailer-Go indicators are likely to come from the delivery layer rather than the lure itself. Phishing content can be changed quickly, and a Workers URL can disappear. The tracking structure is more consistent.In this campaign, Mailer-Go links used *.link.&lt;domain&gt; subdomains and a /t/v3. path containing a numeric campaign ID followed by a long hexadecimal token:hxxps://&lt;8-hex&gt;.link.&lt;domain&gt;/t/v3.&lt;campaign-id&gt;.&lt;recipient-token&gt;The admin panel also exposed reusable fingerprints, including the title Mailer-Go Mission Control and versioned JavaScript paths such as:/assets/js/tracking.js?v=20260522d/assets/js/proxies.js?v=20260513b/assets/dist/emailbuilder2/manifest.jsonFor Microsoft 365 environments, a confirmed device-code phishing event should not be handled as ordinary password phishing. If the attacker received a refresh token, resetting the password may leave access intact. Response should include revoking active sessions and refresh tokens, reviewing device-code sign-ins, checking app consent, reviewing registered authentication methods and devices, and looking for new mailbox rules, MFA changes or suspicious file access after the click.<h2>Attribution and limits</h2>We have not linked this campaign to a named threat actor.The operator appears to be a customer of EvilTokens, which is commercially sold. Mailer-Go is less clear. Its licensing features and commercial-style architecture suggest controlled distribution, but we do not know how the platform is sold or shared, and we cannot rule out the possibility that the operator behind this campaign is also involved in its development.There are other limits to what the available evidence can tell us. We observed a low-confidence PE download signal in sandbox telemetry, but no executable was recovered and the same signal appeared when sandboxing the Mailer-Go admin panel itself. Without endpoint evidence showing a PE download or execution after a victim click, we do not treat that as confirmed victim-side malware delivery.<h2>Conclusion</h2>The reported link was already burned, but it still exposed the campaign’s delivery architecture. Behind the expired URL sat a Mailer-Go tracking server, a backup domain with a fake root site, relay nodes of unconfirmed ownership and an EvilTokens page abusing Microsoft’s device-code flow.Mailer-Go is the part defenders should track beyond this campaign. The final lure can change. The Workers URL can disappear. The delivery layer leaves stronger patterns: *.link.&lt;domain&gt; subdomains, /t/v3 tracking paths, single-use tokens, exposed admin panels and a small set of reusable JS fingerprints.<h2>Sources and credits</h2><ul type="disc"><li data-list-item-id="e85ca59061a0c2a3192dac54b484f8035">Website snapshots (Figures 1, 2): urlscan.io</li><li data-list-item-id="e4395200636d122ba2fa1724623960f0c">EvilTokens background: public research by Sekoia and Push Security</li></ul>

A single expired URL exposed a phishing campaign built around Mailer-Go, Cloudflare Workers and an EvilTokens OneDrive lure.

The phishing link that died on purpose

Security Evangelist at Gen

Threat Operations Analyst at Gen

A fake invoice in your email is easy to ignore. A fake invoice inside your order history feels different.&nbsp;Norton customers have reported fake Norton invoices appearing inside the Shop app, the shopping and order-tracking app from Shopify. Public reports suggest the same technique is not limited to Norton. Similar suspicious Shop app notifications have used McAfee, Apple gift cards, iPhones, PayPal-style payment claims and other high-value purchases as bait. The impersonated brand may change, but the mechanics are familiar: make the user believe they have been charged, then give them a phone number to call.&nbsp;That phone number is where the scam really begins.&nbsp;<h4>Why the Shop app makes this more believable&nbsp;</h4>Shop is a legitimate app. People use it to track packages, check receipts and receive order updates. According to Shop’s own documentation, the app can automatically track orders from several sources, including Gmail, Outlook, the email address linked to the user’s Shop account and orders paid through Shop Pay. If Gmail or Outlook is connected, Shop says it scans recent emails for keywords such as “tracking number” and “track your package” to populate deliveries in the Orders tab.&nbsp;

Shop also supports push notifications for delivery updates, payments and favorite products. So the first alert the victim sees may not be an email, an SMS or a calendar invite. It may be a notification from an app they already use for real purchases.&nbsp;That context matters. The scam text is not especially polished. Some of the examples we reviewed contain awkward wording and obvious signs of fraud. But when the message appears inside an order-tracking app, surrounded by real receipts and shipping updates, users may give it more credibility than it deserves.&nbsp;The screenshots reported to us show fake orders under generic seller names such as “My Store.” The receipts claim that a Norton or Norton LifeLock subscription has been activated or renewed, usually for several hundred dollars. The phone number appears in the product description, the receipt body or even the shipping address field.&nbsp;That is not how a normal receipt should look.&nbsp;<h4>The brand is interchangeable&nbsp;</h4>Norton is the example we saw through customer reports. Norton support now warns that scammers may abuse Android and iOS shopping platforms or applications to generate fake order notifications that appear to be legitimate Norton purchases. Those notifications may include fake order confirmations, fake charges, trusted third-party app delivery and fake support phone numbers embedded in order details.&nbsp;Public user reports point to a wider pattern. One Reddit user described receiving a Shop.app message about a transaction they did not recognize, with no follow-up email confirmation, and a message telling them to call support if the order was not placed by them. Another thread includes reports of unrecognized iPhone purchases under “My Store,” suspicious contact emails and users saying they saw no matching charges on their bank cards. Other reports mention fictitious Apple gift card purchases and iPhone orders using the same kind of wording: “If Order Not Placed By You,” followed by a phone number.&nbsp;The choice of brand is part of the social engineering. A fake security subscription charge plays on two fears at once: being billed for something you did not buy, and being left unprotected if you ignore it. Apple products and gift cards create high-value purchase panic. PayPal-style wording makes users worry about payment account abuse. In each case, the fake order is there to push the victim toward a call.&nbsp;<h4>What we know, and what we do not&nbsp;</h4>We have not found any evidence that any of the impersonated brands have been compromised.&nbsp;&nbsp;We also should not claim that Shop or Shopify was breached based on the evidence we have. The exact abuse path still needs confirmation. The fake order may be entering the app through a merchant/order workflow, through email parsing, through account association, or through another legitimate mechanism that scammers have found a way to misuse. Shop’s own documentation shows that orders can populate from multiple sources, so assuming one route would be premature.&nbsp;&nbsp;What we can say is narrower and stronger: scammers are placing fake purchase claims inside shopping app order experiences, where users are used to seeing real receipts and order updates. Norton’s own support page now describes this class of shopping app scam, and public reports show similar lures using other brands and products.&nbsp;&nbsp;That is enough to warn users without overstating the technical evidence.&nbsp;<h4>How the scam works&nbsp;</h4>The user receives a notification or sees a new order in the Shop app. The order looks like a receipt for something expensive: a security subscription, an Apple gift card, an iPhone, a MacBook or another high-value purchase.

The receipt says the charge has been processed, the subscription has renewed, or the order is being prepared. Somewhere in the order details, the scammer inserts a phone number, email address or support instruction.&nbsp;The wording is often clumsy. We have seen phrases like “If Order Not Place By You” and “If Need Help.” Those errors may look obvious when reviewing a screenshot. They are easier to miss when a phone notification tells you that hundreds of dollars have just been charged.&nbsp;If the victim calls, the scam moves off-platform. The person answering may claim to be billing support, Norton support, PayPal support or a cancellation department. The script can vary, but the request usually moves toward credentials, payment data, one-time codes or remote access software.&nbsp;By that point, the fake receipt has done its job. It has created enough urgency for the victim to enter a conversation controlled by the scammer.&nbsp;<h4>Why this is harder for users to judge&nbsp;</h4>Most people understand that email can be spam. They may still fall for phishing, but at least the inbox is a place where scams are expected.&nbsp;Order-tracking apps are different. Their purpose is to collect receipts, shipping updates and purchase information in one place. A notification from that environment can feel as if it has already passed through some layer of trust, even when the content inside the order is fraudulent.&nbsp;We have seen the same logic with calendar invite scams. The message itself is not always convincing, but the delivery channel changes how people read it. A fake invoice in an inbox is one thing. A fake invoice inside a calendar reminder or shopping app receipt can feel closer to a real event.&nbsp;For security products, this also creates a detection problem. The first visible alert may not be an email, SMS or malicious website. It may be a legitimate app notification carrying fraudulent text. The scam still depends on social engineering, but the delivery surface is harder to classify with the usual rules.&nbsp;<h4>What to do if you see one&nbsp;</h4>Do not call the number in the receipt.&nbsp;Check the charge directly. Open your bank or credit card app. Open the official account for the brand being impersonated. If it claims to be Norton, go to your Norton account or official Norton support. If it claims to involve PayPal, open PayPal directly. Do not use the phone number, email address or link inside the suspicious order.&nbsp;If there is no matching charge, treat the receipt as a scam attempt.&nbsp;Report the suspicious store or message in the Shop app if the option is available. Shop’s help pages say suspicious Shop stores can be reported from the store page through the app, and Shopify also tells users to forward phishing messages to its phishing inbox.&nbsp;&nbsp;Norton users can forward suspicious messages to Norton and should verify unexpected charges only through their Norton account or official Norton support channels.&nbsp;&nbsp;Opening the receipt does not automatically mean your device was compromised. The risk increases if you call the number, share information, install software or follow instructions from the person on the phone.&nbsp;<h4>What to do if you have already called&nbsp;</h4>End the call.&nbsp;If you shared payment details, contact your bank or card provider immediately using the number on your card or inside your banking app. If you gave away a password, change it from a different device if possible. Start with your email account, Apple ID or Google account, banking account and any account connected to the fake invoice.&nbsp;If you installed remote access software, disconnect the device from the internet and remove the software. Run a security scan before using the device again for banking, email or shopping.&nbsp;If you gave a one-time code to the caller, treat the related account as compromised. Change the password, review recovery options and check recent login activity.&nbsp;<h4>The lesson&nbsp;</h4>Scammers keep testing new places to put old tricks. For years, fake invoices were mostly an email problem. Then similar subscription notices appeared in calendar invites. Now we are seeing fake receipts inside shopping app order histories and push notification flows.&nbsp;The safest response is to separate the alert from the action. If an app, email, text message or calendar invite says you have been charged, do not use the contact details inside that alert. Go directly to the account or payment provider yourself. Check whether the charge exists. Use official support channels.&nbsp;The fake receipt, the fake support number and the fake emergency are all part of the same controlled environment. The moment you verify the charge somewhere else, the scam loses most of its power.&nbsp;

Scammers are using order-tracking apps to place fake receipts where users expect to see real purchases, then pushing them to call fake support numbers. 

Fake invoices are moving from inboxes to shopping apps 

Threat Researcher at Gen

<h2>Introduction&nbsp;</h2>Infostealers are constantly evolving, and so are the techniques they use to bypass <a href="https://security.googleblog.com/2024/07/improving-security-of-chrome-cookies-on.html" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Application-Bound Encryption (ABE)</a>. In recent weeks, Vidar has been among the most actively developed stealers and, apart from <a href="https://x.com/GenThreatLabs/status/2064836539952361976" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">multiple updates to its string obfuscation</a> and <a href="https://x.com/GenThreatLabs/status/2061462524604649840" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">a reworked approach to protecting its configuration</a>, it has also introduced a novel technique for bypassing ABE. And while there have been many other changes in Vidar lately, with new versions dropping every week, in this blog post we focus solely on the ABE bypass and its technical aspects.&nbsp; &nbsp;<h2>The ABE Bypass&nbsp;</h2>From a high-level perspective, Vidar’s approach to bypassing ABE is somewhat similar to that of Remus/Lumma, in that both try to extract the <code>v20_master_key</code> directly from the browser’s memory. What sets them apart, however, is how they achieve it. Since we’ve already covered the inner workings of ABE in earlier posts (<a href="https://www.gendigital.com/blog/insights/research/remus-64bit-variant-of-lumma-stealer" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Remus</a>, <a href="https://www.gendigital.com/blog/insights/research/voidstealer-abe-bypass" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">VoidStealer</a>), we don’t revisit them here and focus instead on the bypass itself. For readers interested in the broader background, we encourage checking those earlier posts.&nbsp;&nbsp;In short, the end goal of infostealers is to obtain the <code>v20_master_key</code>, as it alone is sufficient for decrypting any ABE-protected data tied to a specific application. This key can be obtained in one of two ways: either from disk, where it is protected by two layers of <code>CryptProtectData</code> (one applied in the context of the logged-in user and one as <code>NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM</code>), or from the browser’s memory – the direction Vidar took.&nbsp;In memory, however, the key is kept protected with <code>CryptProtectMemory</code> using the <code>CRYPTPROTECTMEMORY_SAME_PROCESS</code> flag. This ensures that even if an attacker manages to read the encrypted form of the key from memory, they cannot simply decrypt it (they would need to invoke the complementary <code>CryptUnprotectMemory</code> function directly from within the browser process). That leaves attackers with two problems to solve: how to find the encrypted key in memory, and how to get it decrypted.&nbsp;<h2>Locating the v20_master_key in Browser’s Memory&nbsp;</h2>Vidar’s approach to locating the encrypted <code>v20_master_key</code> in memory involves scanning the entire memory of a running browser for a specific pattern. But that first requires a browser process to scan.&nbsp;When the target browser is already running, Vidar reuses the existing process. However, it doesn’t read its memory directly. Instead, it creates a fork of it using <code>NtCreateProcessEx</code> with <code>SectionHandle</code> set to <code>NULL</code>, instructing the kernel to clone the address space of the process specified by the <code>ParentProcess</code> as a copy-on-write mapping. The resulting process has no threads and is never resumed – it exists purely as a static memory snapshot.&nbsp;&nbsp;To perform the fork, Vidar first opens a handle to the target browser via <code>OpenProcess</code> with <code>PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION | PROCESS_CREATE_PROCESS | PROCESS_VM_READ</code>, falling back to <code>PROCESS_CREATE_PROCESS</code> if the initial call fails. It then passes this handle as the <code>ParentProcess</code> argument to <code>NtCreateProcessEx</code>, requesting <code>PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS</code> on the resulting child. If the fork fails, Vidar falls back to scanning the live browser process directly.&nbsp;

If no target browser process is found running, Vidar creates a new isolated desktop via <code>CreateDesktopA</code>, assigns it a name of the form <code>v20_%d</code> (where <code>%d</code> is replaced with the browser’s index in Vidar’s configuration), and launches the target browser in there. In the case of Vidar version 2.1, the browser is launched with the command line <code>--no-first-run --disable-gpu about:blank</code>, although the exact command line varies across versions. Since modern browsers use a multi-process architecture, there are typically multiple processes matching a given browser. Vidar enumerates all of them (up to 64) and applies the fork-and-scan procedure to each one independently.&nbsp;

With a handle to the forked process in hand, Vidar proceeds to enumerate its virtual memory regions using <code>NtQueryVirtualMemory</code>. It iterates through the entire browser’s address space, collecting regions that match a specific profile: committed (<code>MEM_COMMIT</code>), private (<code>MEM_PRIVATE</code>), and either readable (<code>PAGE_READONLY</code>) or read-write (<code>PAGE_READWRITE</code>). Vidar records up to 4096 memory regions matching these requirements, along with their base addresses and sizes. The actual pattern scanning is then performed in parallel with up to 64 worker threads, depending on the system.&nbsp;&nbsp;

Each thread scans its assigned regions using <code>NtReadVirtualMemory</code>, searching for a 32-byte pattern. When a match is found, the thread reads 8 bytes at offset +32 from the match, interprets them as a pointer, and validates that it points to committed, private, and readable memory (the expected memory state for the encrypted <code>v20_master_key</code>).&nbsp;&nbsp;

This naturally raises the question of what pattern Vidar searches for. The answer is a 32-byte signature: <code>76 32 30 00 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? 03 00 00 00 00 01 ?? ?? ??</code>, where <code>??</code> denotes a wildcard (Vidar uses the byte <code>AA</code> as the wildcard marker in its internal representation). Notably, the first four bytes correspond to the ASCII <code>v20\x00</code>, which is a common prefix used for ABE-related data.&nbsp;&nbsp;

We assess with high confidence that this pattern is intended to match a node structure within Chromium’s <code>Encryptor::KeyRing</code>, the structure that holds the keys used by the <code>Encryptor</code> class. Now, this part is admittedly a bit tricky as it relies on several assumptions we made about the internal memory layout, as well as on implementation-specific representations of various C++ standard library types <code>(std::map</code>, <code>std::string</code>, <code>std::vector</code>, <code>std::optional</code>), which is why we frame this as a high-confidence rather than a certainty.&nbsp;&nbsp;Our reasoning is as follows: <code>KeyRing</code> is <a href="https://github.com/chromium/chromium/blob/cf5d502bcaedb22927e3829a18be1ff6d8b6f598/components/os_crypt/async/common/encryptor.h#L132" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">defined</a> as <code>std::map&lt;/*tag=*/std::string, std::optional&lt;Key&gt;&gt;</code>, and <code>std::map</code> is typically implemented as a red-black tree, where each tree node stores three pointers (left child, parent, and right child) followed by the key-value pair. In this case, the pair is in the form of <code>std::pair&lt;/*tag=*/std::string, std::optional&lt;Key&gt;&gt;</code>, meaning that the <code>std::string</code> and the <code>Key</code> object might be laid out consecutively in memory within each node. For a <code>v20_master_key</code> entry, the tag corresponds to the string <code>v20</code>, which at 4 bytes including the null terminator fits within the small string optimization (SSO) buffer and is therefore stored inline rather than heap-allocated. The <code>Key</code> class that immediately follows <a href="https://github.com/chromium/chromium/blob/cf5d502bcaedb22927e3829a18be1ff6d8b6f598/components/os_crypt/async/common/encryptor.h#L93-L98" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">contains three member variables</a>: <code>std::optional&lt;mojom::Algorithm&gt; algorithm_</code>, <code>std::vector&lt;uint8_t&gt; key_</code>, and <code>bool encrypted_ = false</code>.&nbsp;Putting it all together and applying it to a concrete example from a browser memory dump, we get the following layout:&nbsp;

Please note that while the exact layout may contain minor inaccuracies on our part, the overall structure should be roughly correct. For easier orientation, the following diagram illustrates how the individual structures are nested within each other:&nbsp;

At this point, it should be clear how the scan pattern maps onto the searched structure. The 32-byte match covers the <code>std::string</code> tag <code>v20\x00</code> and the beginning of the <code>Key</code> object up to and including <code>algorithm_</code>. The pointer at offset +32 from the start of the match then lands precisely on <code>key_.begin</code>, the first member of <code>std::vector&lt;uint8_t&gt;</code> that holds the encrypted <code>v20_master_key</code>.&nbsp;Matches from all threads are collected into a shared buffer and subjected to a majority-voting scheme: candidates consisting mostly of zeroes are discarded, the rest are pairwise-compared, and each is scored by the number of identical copies found. This voting is performed independently for each browser process, producing one best candidate per process.&nbsp;<h2>Decrypting the v20_master_key via APC Injections&nbsp;</h2>For each browser process that produced a match, Vidar now holds a candidate address pointing to a potential encrypted <code>v20_master_key</code>. However, as already noted, since the key is protected with <code>CryptProtectMemory</code> using <code>CRYPTPROTECTMEMORY_SAME_PROCESS</code>, it can only be decrypted by invoking <code>CryptUnprotectMemory</code> from within the browser process itself. Vidar solves this by injecting an Asynchronous Procedure Call (APC) into the live browser process.&nbsp;Vidar supports two APC injection methods, selected based on whether ESET or Bitdefender is detected on the system. If either of these products is present, Vidar uses the first method, which it refers to as “classic” (based on decrypted strings) – it creates a suspended thread in the target browser via <code>CreateRemoteThread</code> (with <code>NtTestAlert</code> as the thread start address and the <code>CREATE_SUSPENDED</code> flag), queues an APC using <code>NtQueueApcThread</code>, resumes the thread, and then waits for it to complete via <code>WaitForSingleObject</code> with a randomized timeout. When the thread resumes, it calls <code>NtTestAlert</code>, which flushes the APC queue and executes the injected routine.&nbsp;

If neither product is detected, it uses the “special” method – it finds an existing thread in the target browser using a combination of <code>CreateToolhelp32Snapshot</code> and <code>Thread32First/Thread32Next</code>, opens it via <code>NtOpenThread</code>, and calls <code>NtQueueApcThreadEx2</code> with the <code>QUEUE_USER_APC_FLAGS_SPECIAL_USER_APC</code> flag. Unlike regular APCs, special user APCs execute immediately. Therefore, the target thread does not need to be in an alertable wait state.&nbsp;

In both cases, the APC routine to be executed is <code>CryptUnprotectMemory</code>, called with the following three arguments: the address of the encrypted <code>v20_master_key</code> candidate, its size (32 bytes), and <code>CRYPTPROTECTMEMORY_SAME_PROCESS</code> for the <code>flags</code> parameter.&nbsp;&nbsp;Since <code>CryptUnprotectMemory</code> decrypts the data in place, once the APC executes, the key is decrypted directly in the live browser's memory. To read it, Vidar creates a second fork of the browser process and reads the key from the same address using <code>NtReadVirtualMemory</code>. It then compares the result against a snapshot of the encrypted key taken from the first fork before the APC call – if the data is unchanged, decryption failed, and Vidar moves on to the next browser process’s candidate.&nbsp;If the data differs, Vidar uses the same second fork to perform an additional verification: it scans the forked process’s memory for the byte sequence <code>v20</code> and, treating each match as a potentially ABE-encrypted entry (cookie, password), attempts AES-256-GCM decryption with the key candidate using <code>BCryptDecrypt</code> (successful GCM tag verification confirms that the key is correct).&nbsp;Whenever the data has changed (indicating that decryption of the key took place), Vidar re-encrypts the key in the browser’s memory by injecting another APC with <code>CryptProtectMemory</code> as the routine, preserving the browser’s state. If no candidate produced a successful decryption (i.e., the data remained unchanged after every APC call), Vidar takes a more aggressive approach: it terminates all browser instances, restarts the browser, and repeats the entire scan-decrypt-verify cycle.&nbsp;By abusing APC injections instead of the more traditional approach of injecting code via <code>NtWriteVirtualMemory</code> that performs the decryption, Vidar trades one suspicious behavior for another. APC injections are arguably less common and may thus slip past some detection systems, though they are still well-known techniques monitored by AV and EDR solutions. But that is the nature of ABE bypasses – each has its own advantages and disadvantages, and that’s exactly why infostealers keep inventing new ones. &nbsp;<h2>Indicator of Compromise (IoC)&nbsp;</h2>459daa809751e73f60fbbe4384a7d1653c36bb06945e4eb3635270924241100a (Vidar 2.1)&nbsp;

A Technical Walkthrough of How Vidar Defeats Application-Bound Encryption

Inside Vidar’s ABE Bypass: From Memory Scanning to APC Injections

You have a summer flight booked. You have seen the headlines about jet fuel shortages, cancelled routes and higher travel costs. Then a text message arrives: your flight has been affected, and you need to click a link to confirm your refund or rebook before the offer expires.&nbsp;That message feels plausible because the situation around it is real. In April, <a href="https://www.iata.org/en/pressroom/2026-releases/2026-04-17-01/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">IATA warned</a> that Europe could start seeing flight cancellations by the end of May if jet fuel shortages materialized. Airlines and governments have since been trying to reassure travelers, while also publishing guidance on passenger rights, refunds and re-routing.&nbsp;&nbsp;That is exactly the kind of confusion scammers like. They do not need to cause the disruption, they only need to arrive at the right moment, with the right brand logo and the right sense of urgency.&nbsp;<h4>Why travel disruption works so well as a scam hook&nbsp;</h4>Most scam messages fail because they arrive out of context. A random refund email from an airline you never use is easy to ignore. A refund message from the airline you are flying with next week, during a period of public travel disruption, is different.&nbsp;The scammer’s job is to make you think: “This could be real.”&nbsp;That can happen in several ways. You might receive a fake cancellation email that links to a refund form. You might search for an airline’s customer service number and land on a fake support page. You might post publicly on social media asking an airline for help, then receive a reply from an account that looks official. Or you might get a WhatsApp message that knows your hotel name, travel dates or booking reference.&nbsp;Each version uses the same pressure point: you are worried about losing money, losing your flight or being stranded.&nbsp;Criminals are already using disruption this way. In March, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/money/2026/mar/15/travel-scam-airline-accounts-fake-refunds-iran-war-flight-disruption" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">The Guardian reported</a> that fake airline support accounts were targeting travelers affected by Middle East flight disruption. Some victims were looking for help or refunds, then received replies from accounts pretending to represent airlines. The scam moved into direct messages, where victims were asked for details and sent links that led to money being taken instead of refunded.&nbsp;&nbsp;The jet fuel story gives scammers another pretext. A message can claim that your flight was cancelled, your fare changed, your fuel surcharge failed, or your refund must be claimed within a few hours. None of those claims needs to be true to be effective.&nbsp;<h4>The scam may start before the message arrives&nbsp;</h4>A fake travel message becomes much harder to spot when it includes real information.&nbsp;This is the idea behind <a href="https://www.gendigital.com/blog/insights/research/reservation-hijack-scam" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Reservation Hijack scams</a>, a form of targeted phishing where cybercriminals use real booking details to make a message look legitimate. In some cases, attackers may use information exposed through breaches or compromised travel systems. In other cases, they collect details from emails, social media posts, previous leaks or fake customer service interactions. Gen has previously described Reservation Hijack scams as scams that use real hotel booking details to make fraudulent payment or verification requests feel authentic.&nbsp;&nbsp;That distinction matters. A scam message does not need your credit card number to fool you. Knowing your name, your destination, your travel dates and your booking platform may be enough.&nbsp;<h4>What these scams can look like&nbsp;</h4>A travel disruption scam usually does not begin with a strange offer. It begins with something boring and administrative. That is part of the trick.&nbsp;You may see messages like:&nbsp;“Your flight has been cancelled due to fuel supply issues. Claim your refund here.”&nbsp;“Your rebooking is pending. Confirm passenger details within two hours.”&nbsp;“Additional airport tax or fuel surcharge is required to keep your booking.”&nbsp;“Your hotel reservation will be cancelled unless payment is verified.”&nbsp;“Due to high call volume, please continue this request on WhatsApp.”&nbsp;The exact wording changes, but the structure is familiar. There is a problem, a deadline and a link. The message may also move you away from the official channel into SMS, WhatsApp, Telegram, direct messages or a phone call. Once that happens, the scammer controls the conversation.&nbsp;There is another detail worth watching: some messages do not ask for money immediately. They start by asking for your booking reference, last name, phone number or one-time password. That can still be dangerous. Those details can help scammers access a booking, impersonate you to customer support, reset an account or make the next message more convincing.&nbsp;<h4>Your real passenger rights can be used against you&nbsp;</h4>If an airline cancels your flight, you may have rights to a refund, re-routing or assistance, depending on where you are travelling and the rules that apply. The European Commission said passengers affected by cancellations continue to have rights to reimbursement, re-routing or return, airport assistance and compensation for last-minute cancellations in relevant circumstances. It also said airlines cannot retroactively add fuel surcharges to already published final ticket prices.&nbsp;&nbsp;That information is useful for travelers, but it is also useful for scammers.&nbsp;A fake refund message becomes more believable when people already know refunds are possible. A fake rebooking link becomes more believable when airlines are genuinely changing schedules. A fake “fuel surcharge” demand becomes more dangerous when fuel prices are in the news, even though legitimate retroactive charges may not be allowed in many cases.&nbsp;This is why the safest route is not to judge the message only by whether the story sounds plausible. During travel disruption, many scam stories will sound plausible. Judge the channel instead.&nbsp;<h4>How to check before you click&nbsp;</h4>Start from the airline or booking platform’s official app or website. Do not use the link in the message. Open the app yourself, type the website address yourself, or use the contact details listed on your original booking confirmation.&nbsp;Check whether the same cancellation, refund or payment request appears inside your account. If the message is real, the airline or hotel should be able to confirm it through an official channel.&nbsp;Be careful with social media support. If an account replies to your public complaint, check whether it is linked from the airline’s official website. Look at the handle carefully. Fake support accounts often copy logos and names, but have small differences in spelling, low follower counts or recently created profiles. The Guardian reported that fraudsters often scan social media for passengers trying to contact legitimate airline accounts and reply to them first, which makes the scam harder to spot.&nbsp;&nbsp;Do not share one-time passwords, payment card details or login credentials with anyone who contacts you unexpectedly. A real airline or hotel does not need your banking OTP to send you a refund.&nbsp;Be especially suspicious of pressure. “You have 30 minutes to claim your refund” is not customer service. It is a tactic.&nbsp;<h4>What to do if you already clicked&nbsp;</h4>If you entered payment details, contact your bank or card provider immediately. Ask whether the transaction can be blocked or reversed, and request a new card if needed.&nbsp;If you shared login details for an airline, hotel or booking platform, change the password from the official site or app. Use a unique password, not one you use elsewhere. Turn on two-factor authentication where it is available.&nbsp;If you shared a one-time password or authentication code, assume the account may have been accessed. Check your booking details, payment methods and recent account activity.&nbsp;Report the scam to the airline, hotel or booking platform being impersonated. If the scam came through social media, report the account as impersonation. If money was taken, report it to the relevant fraud authority in your country.&nbsp;<h4>The real lesson for summer travel&nbsp;</h4>Travel disruption changes how people behave. They search for support numbers in a hurry. They post publicly because customer service queues are long. They accept strange instructions because they are worried about losing a flight or refund.&nbsp;Scammers build around that behavior.&nbsp;The safest assumption is simple: if a message about your flight, hotel or refund creates urgency and gives you a link, pause. Go back to the official source. A real cancellation will still be there when you check through the airline or booking platform. A scammer needs you to act before you do.&nbsp;

Travel disruption gives scammers the one thing they need most: a believable reason to rush you

Your flight was cancelled. Is the refund message real? 

A fake job interview page is easier to trust than a fake ticket shop.In samples reviewed by Gen threat researchers, scammers used branded hiring pages that looked like ordinary recruitment flows: a company logo, a recruiter profile, a 30-minute meeting, and a button to continue with Google or Facebook. There was no attachment to open and no software to install. The credential theft attempt sat inside a step many job applicants already expect: signing in to schedule a call.FIFA is an obvious lure ahead of the 2026 World Cup. On May 22, ESET reported fake FIFA-themed websites that copied ticket and merchandise flows to steal money and personal data. Our researchers later found another FIFA-themed domain, hxxps://fifa-mg[.]shop, which followed a naming pattern not mentioned in that report. Domains like these can be short-lived, often appearing for hours or days before they are blocked, abandoned, or taken down.Our researchers also found a different kind of FIFA lure: hxxps://fifahiring[.]com, a fake hiring page that encouraged users to schedule a call with an alleged FIFA recruiter. When a user tried to register with a personal Gmail address, the page asked for a business email instead. The page was steering victims toward credentials with more value: accounts that could provide access to a company environment.

<h4>The FIFA hiring page did not point to FIFA</h4>The fake page looked believable at first glance.

It used FIFA branding, presented a recruiter identity, and copied parts of the experience users see on legitimate recruiting and scheduling platforms. The recruiter’s name and photo appeared to match a real LinkedIn profile, which made the page feel more credible. For publication, we should keep that person’s identity redacted.The domain did not match FIFA’s real hiring infrastructure. FIFA’s legitimate careers pages are jobs.fifa.com and fifa.pinpointhq.com. The fake page used neither. It also loaded the favicon from the real FIFA recruitment site hosted at pinpointhq.com, giving the page a small visual cue borrowed from the legitimate service.Other signals pointed in the same direction. The domain and certificate were newly created, from May 23. The site used commodity hosting infrastructure, including Vercel and Render, rather than a corporate environment. Those signs are not enough on their own, but they fit the rest of the evidence.The login flow was the clearest part. Credentials were posted to:fifeq2026eqbackeq[.]onrender[.]com/api/loginThe Google sign-in prompt was not a real Google authentication window. It was rendered inside the page itself. The visible controls and links did nothing, and the page did not send the user into a genuine Google sign-in flow. According to the analysis, the only Google asset loaded was the favicon, apparently to make the fake window look familiar.A page can look like it opened a Google login without ever handing control to Google.Researchers also observed hxxps://careers-fifahiring[.]com, which later became inactive, and hxxps://fifajobs[.]com, which showed the same content and was indexed by Google.&nbsp;<h4>The recruitment lure went beyond FIFA</h4>The FIFA page was one version of a wider recruitment phishing pattern. The brand can change. The flow stays familiar: recruiter profile, meeting prompt, business email, fake sign-in.Researchers found similar fake hiring pages abusing other major brands, including Heineken, Hilton, Coca-Cola, Netflix, PepsiCo, Delta,&nbsp;and Spotify. In the Heineken case, the page appeared to use the identity of someone who, according to LinkedIn, really works as a recruiter at the company.

Additional hunting found two other recruitment-themed kits:hxxps://aquent-talent-jobs[.]com hxxps://hays-talent-opportunities[.]comThe Hays-themed version targeted Facebook credentials instead of Google credentials. Researchers assessed that the Aquent and Hays pages shared code, although they differed from the earlier FIFA examples.

This flexibility makes the campaign harder to frame as a single World Cup scam. FIFA provides the timely hook, but the mechanism is recruitment phishing. A scammer can swap the logo, recruiter name, and sign-in provider while keeping the same basic path to the victim’s credentials.<h4>Why fake recruitment pages work</h4>Recruitment gives attackers a clean excuse to ask for things that might otherwise raise suspicion.A candidate expects to click a scheduling link. They expect a recruiter profile. They expect a calendar prompt. In some cases, they may also expect to use a work email, especially for corporate, contractor, or partner-facing roles.The fake login window turns that ordinary flow into credential theft. Users are used to “Continue with Google” and “Continue with Facebook” buttons, but the button itself proves nothing. A genuine authentication flow should take the user to the provider’s domain and controls. A fake page can draw a convincing copy while keeping the victim inside the attacker-controlled site.The business email prompt is also a warning sign. A page that rejects a personal email and asks for a work address may be trying to raise the value of the stolen account.<h4>What job seekers should check before signing in</h4>Start from the company’s official careers page, not from a link in a message, ad, search result, or forwarded post. For FIFA, that means checking jobs.fifa.com or fifa.pinpointhq.com, not trusting a domain because it contains “fifa,” “career,” “hiring,” or “jobs.”Look closely at the domain before entering credentials. Scam pages often add plausible hiring words around a brand name: career, talent, jobs, hiring, portal, or connect. A polished page on a new domain is still a new domain.Treat the sign-in step as the real checkpoint. If a page offers Google or Facebook login, check whether the flow actually opens a real provider-controlled authentication page. A fake window embedded inside the original site, broken controls, inactive links, or a provider logo used only as decoration should stop the process.Use security software that includes web and phishing protection. These tools can block known malicious pages before they load, which is especially useful when scam domains look polished, appear in search results, or are shared through otherwise legitimate channels.<h4>What companies can do</h4>Recruitment pages are public by design, which makes them easy to copy.Security teams should monitor for newly registered domains combining their brand with hiring-related terms. They should also watch for pages that reuse favicons, recruiter photos, job descriptions, and calendar-booking language from legitimate hiring flows.HR and recruiting teams should make the official hiring path easy to verify. Candidates should not have to guess whether a domain is legitimate. A clear careers page, consistent recruiter communication, and warnings about unofficial scheduling links can remove some of the ambiguity attackers rely on.<h4>Conclusion</h4>The fake FIFA hiring page worked because it did not feel unusual. It looked like a normal step in a hiring process.Attackers do not need to invent new behavior when they can copy one people already trust. A branded scheduling page, a recruiter profile, and a familiar sign-in button can be enough to move a victim from interest to credential entry.The decision point is the login. Before entering a work email or password, check the domain, check where the authentication flow really goes, and verify the role through the company’s official careers site. Security software with web and phishing protection adds another layer, especially against short-lived scam pages that may only stay online for hours or days.IOCs:hxxps://fifahiring[.]com hxxps://careers-fifahiring[.]com hxxps://fifajobs[.]com hxxps://fifa-mg[.]shop hxxps://heineken-careers[.]com hxxps://aquent-talent-jobs[.]com hxxps://hays-talent-opportunities[.]com fifeq2026eqbackeq[.]onrender[.]com/api/login

Jan Kořínek

Posts by Jan Kořínek

The phishing link that died on purpose